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ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court again began to delve into substantial patent issues by
addressing the interplay between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of
equivalents. An analysis of the opinions in the Federal Circuit's en banc ruling,
together with the Supreme Court's own decision may help to clarify some of the
unanswered questions still lingering regarding what equivalents are available and
when. The prosecution history will take a more prominent place in the minds of both
patent prosecutors and litigators as courts attempt to determine the appropriate
relationship between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents.

Copyright © 2003 The John Marshall Law School
Cite as 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 182

THE POST-FESTOWORLD OF EQUIVALENTS
MICHAEL D. KAMINSKI

*

I. OVERVIEW
On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court in their significant Festo decision (Festo
J/1) 1 gave a positive boost to the patent system through the unanimous reversal of the
highly controversial Federal Circuit 2000 en banc decision. 2 Yet, exactly one week
later, Festo was immediately overshadowed by the radical Supreme Court "Vornado
Tornado;" the Vurnado decision put an end to exclusive appellate jurisdiction for
3
patent appeals.
In terms of a positive message to the Wall Street community, Festo may be the
single most important patent case in the more than twenty years since the Supreme
Court delivered the message of patent-eligibility for "living" inventions in the
Chakrabarty case. 4 Both Festo and Chakrarbarty sent strong signals to high
technology investors that the Supreme Court is "pro-patent." This is despite the fact
that the underlying legal effect may have been relatively minor, as in Chakrabarty5
or, as in the case of Festo 1, have a drastic effect on the practice of patent law. Festo
II is truly revolutionary, a "first" for the Supreme Court. The case may be the first
time in history that any Court of Appeals that had found noninfringement was
* Paper presented to the 47t h Annual Conference on Developments in Intellectual
Property Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois, February 28, 2003.
Sharon Barner [SBARNER@FOLEYLAWCOA moderated a program sponsored by Foley &
Lardner in Chicago on June 6, 2002 that was keyed to an early version of this paper and served as a
basis for a presentation to the Japanese Group of the AIPPI, Koku Kaikan, June 27, 2002, by Harold
C. Wegner [HWEGNER@FOLEYLAWCOM] and Stephen B. Maebius [SMAEBIUSFOLEYLAWCOM].
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1 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (May 28, 2002).

2 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 569 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc).
3 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
4 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
5 Chakrabarty merely confirmed the patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of "living"
inventions. However, most biotechnology inventions of commercial import that are claimed as
patentable inventions either are not claimed in terms of a "living" cell or fragment, and those
inventions that are capable of being claimed in that manner can also be claimed as a method independent of the Chakrabarty ruling. The pre-Chakrabarty controversy was to find an
alternative claim form to method claims for the "living" inventions.
For a pre-Chakrabarty
perspective, see Harold C. Wegner, PatentingNature's'Secrets -Microorganisms, 7 INTL REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 235 (1976); Harold C. Wegner, Patent Protection for Novel Mieroorganims
Usefulfor the PreparationofKnown Products, 5 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 285 (1974).
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reversed by the Supreme Court because of a patentee's failure to establish
applicability of the doctrine of equivalents.6 Overall though, Festo confirms the
status quo for most of the en banc Federal Circuit views and crafts a new test for
others; albeit, a test that will be difficult for patentees to apply to avoid prosecution
history estoppel.
This paper considers the practical, day-to-day impact of Festo II, beginning
with the first of the two issues accepted for review by the Court. The first issue
reviewed by the Supreme Court was whether the narrowing of a claim for any reason
creates prosecution history estoppel. 7 See § II, Narrowingfor any Reason Creates
Estoppel. A troublesome point for applicants who have not narrowed their claims,
but who may nevertheless be subject to prosecution history estoppel was not before
the Court: will even a broadening amendment possibly subject the applicant to
prosecution history estoppel if there is an argument that a particular feature
establishes patentability? See § III, Argument Alone Createsan Estoppel.
The second and more hotly debated issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Federal Circuit's "absolute bar" against any equivalents in the wake of
an estoppel should stand.8 The reversal by the Supreme Court opens the door to an
equivalents finding in only a small minority of situations. It may be a legal victory
for Festo in the sense of a reversal and remand with a chance to fight another day;
however, the decision slams the door shut on the familiar practice of narrowing
claims with the hope of recapturing trivial yet known equivalents through the
previous flexible bar approach. See § IV, Flexible (Versus Absolute) Bar.
Not addressed by the Supreme Court and left open for decision by regional
circuits after Vornado is the issue of whether there remains any room left for a
finding of equivalence by the blatant copyist who appropriates the most trivial
variation of a claimed invention. See § V, Whither the Colorable Copyist. Loose ends
concerning the Festo II decision have resulted in the Federal Circuit again issuing an
order for en bane reargument. 9 See § VI, "FestoII'. The Saga Continues.
After deciding a patent case the magnitude of Festo, one would have thought
that the Supreme Court's involvement in patent law was at an end for the near term.
However, that is clearly not the case. The Supreme Court has signaled a clear
intention to stay actively involved in its supervisory role for patents, even reopening
the door to regional circuit decisions on patent cases that will undoubtedly create
inter-circuit conflicts of law, 10 and will clearly lead to a greater number of cases being
accepted by the Supreme Court for review. See § VII, Avoiding Dicta in the Other
Circuits.
While American practitioners have grown up with prosecution history estoppel
as the norm, a comparative view of Japanese patent law shows that there are other
valid approaches. See § VIII, A Comparative View of Prosecution History Estoppel.
Statutory and regulatory reforms are clearly needed to clean up the reliance on
6 A Supreme Court reversal of a trial court before the Evarts Act may be found as recently as
the Morley Sewing Machine case. Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263 (1889).
Several cases in the past century have affirmed a Court of Appeals finding of equivalents, but this
may be the first to reverse a finding of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
7 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 726 (May 28, 2002).
8 Id.
9 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
10Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
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prosecution histories, which often run several inches thick and are undecipherable to
all but the most skilled patent lawyer. See § IX, Statutory Reform to Eliminate
ProsecutionHistoryEstoppel.

II. NARROWING FOR ANY REASON CREATES ESTOPPEL
A. The Message from the Supreme Court
The issue creating the most controversy within the patent bar is the Court's
affirmation of the view that essentially any narrowing amendment of a claim may
create prosecution history estoppel.
This includes any amendments made to
overcome or avoid a rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1 (2000). This even
includes the case where a foreign language applicant provides a sloppy translation
and where "[t]he PTO might require the applicant ...
to improve the translation of a
foreign word....11 Obviously, the message is to clear up the translation before filing.
The Federal Circuit voted 11-1 for this new rule. 12 This overwhelming
majority, coupled with the endorsement of this view by the Solicitor
General, clearly demonstrated the likelihood of affirmance of this holding
by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court explained its ruling by stating,
"[wie agree with the [Federal Circuit] that a narrowing amendment made
' 13
to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel.
Futhermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit's
viewpoint that even an amendment made to deal with a § 112 rejection is
basis for prosecution history estoppel. 14 Under the rationale of the
Supreme Court, it is wrong to dismiss a rejection as merely being "formal,"
as many amicus curiae briefs suggested.1 5 According to the Supreme

" Festo, 535 U.S. 736.
12 Id
13 Festo, 236
14 Idat

F.3d 558.
736. The Supreme Court stated that:

As th[e] [Federal Circuit C]ourt explained, a number of statutory requirements
must be satisfied before a patent can issue. The claimed subject matter must be
useful, novel, and not obvious. In addition, the patent application must describe,
enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying out the invention. These latter
requirements must be satisfied before issuance of the patent, for exclusive patent
rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public. What is
claimed by the patent application must be the same as what is disclosed in the
specification; otherwise the patent should not issue. The patent also should not
issue if the other requirements of § 112 are not satisfied, and an applicant's
failure to meet these requirements could lead to the issued patent being held
invalid in later litigation. Id. at 1839-40 (internal citations omitted).
15Id. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of "formality" type rejections, stating:
[Festo] contends that amendments made to comply with § 112 concern the form of
the application and not the subject matter of the invention. The PTO might
require the applicant to clarify an ambiguous term, to improve the translation of a
foreign word, or to rewrite a dependent claim as an independent one. In these
cases, [Festo] argues, the applicant has no intention of surrendering subject
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Court's decision, the argument that the amendment is largely cosmetic in
16
nature also fails if the scope of the claim is narrowed.

B. The EnduringRule from the FederalCircuit
Since the Federal Circuit ruling on this issue was affirmed by the Supreme
Court, further exploration of the issue by the Federal Circuit is likely to be based
upon its own precedent, although the court is viewed by some of its members as
ignoring its own precedent. 17 Even though the Federal Circuit's majority opinion in
matter and should not be estopped from challenging equivalent devices. While
this may be true in some cases, [Festo]'s argument conflates the patentee's reason
for making the amendment with the impact the amendment has on the subject
matter.

Id.
16Id.

The Supreme Court explained that:
[e]stoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent and the
amendment narrows the patent's scope. If a § 112 amendment is truly cosmetic,
then it would not narrow the patent's scope or raise an estoppel. On the other
hand, if a § 112 amendment is necessary and narrows the patent's scope - even if
only for the purpose of better description - estoppel may apply. A patentee who
narrows a claim as a condition for obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the
broader subject matter, whether the amendment was made to avoid the prior art
or to comply with § 112. We must regard the patentee as having conceded an
inability to claim the broader subject matter or at least as having abandoned his
right to appeal a rejection. In either case estoppel may apply.

Id.
17

F esto, 234 F.3d at 566 (J. Michel dissenting). The Federal Circuit explained that:
[f]or the purposes of determining whether an amendment gives rise to prosecution
history estoppel, a "substantial reason related to patentability" is not limited to
overcoming or avoiding prior art, but instead includes any reason which relates to
the statutory requirements for a patent. Therefore, a narrowing amendment
made for any reason related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give
rise to prosecution history estoppel with respect to the amended claim element.
[T]here are a number of statutory requirements that must be satisfied before a
valid patent can issue and that thus relate to patentability. In addition to
satisfying the novelty and non-obviousness requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
103, the claims must be directed to patentable subject matter and the claimed
invention must be useful, as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Additionally, the
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the patent specification describe,
enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying out the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1 (1994), while the second paragraph of section 112 requires that the claims set
forth the subject matter that the applicant regards as his invention and that the
claims particularly point out and distinctly define the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112,
2 (1994). The Patent Office will reject a patent application that fails to satisfy
any one of these statutory requirements. And any one of these requirements may
be a ground for invalidating an issued patent. An amendment related to any of
these statutory requirements is an amendment made for "a substantial reason
related to patentability."
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Festo I was clear on the on the affect of "formality" rejections and amendments
related to patentability on prosecution history estoppel, the court did leave the door
open for patentee's to establish that an amendment was not for patentability
purposes.18

III. ARGUMENT ALONE CREATES ESTOPPEL
Can there be prosecution history estoppel based upon arguments alone
or where a non-narrowing amendment is made? This issue was not before
the Supreme Court 19 but was considered by the Federal Circuit in their 2000
Festo decision. The Federal Circuit in dictum discusses "argument-based
estoppel." This was a topic without dispute among at least eleven judges, if
not all twelve. 20 The Federal Circuit confirmed the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel where there is an argument made to establish patentability,
even if without any amendment, stating, "[airguments made voluntarily
during prosecution may give rise to prosecution history estoppel if they
21
evidence a surrender of subject matter."
[T]he functions of prosecution history estoppel cannot be fully satisfied if
substantial reasons related to patentability are limited to a narrow subset of
patentability issues. Rather, substantial reasons related to patentability include
35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112 issues, as well as 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 issues.
!-d. at 566-67 (internal citations omitted).
,8 Id. at 567. The Federal Circuit addressed what it perceived as an unanswered question:
[w]hile we do not believe that the Supreme Court itself answered this question in
Warner-Jenkinson, we do believe that our answer is not inconsistent with
Warner-Jenkinson. Warne-Jenkinson describes prior cases as applying
prosecution history estoppel "typically because what [was previously claimed] ...
was encompassed within the prior art," but no language in Warner-Jenkinson
limits prosecution history estoppel to amendments made to avoid prior art.
Moreover, our approach is consistent with Wa±rne±r-Jenkinson'q
requirement that
an amendment "does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that
element." Thus, ifa patent holder can show from the prosecution history that a
claim amendment was not motivated by patentabilityconce-rns, the amendment
will not give rise to prosecution historyestoppel.
Id. at 567-68 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
19The Supreme Court rarely chooses to decide an issue that has not been specifically raised by
one of the parties dissatisfied with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Rather, a losing party poses
one or more questions as issues that the court is asked to consider. Generally, if the court accepts
the review (by an affirmative vote of at least four of the nine members of the Court), it will accept all
or some of the questions raised by a losing party. Here, the issue of estoppel by argument was only
dictum at the Federal Circuit - unnecessary for its decision - and it was not raised as one of the
petitioner's questions for review.
20 Id.
21

at 569.

Id. The court follows this sentence with the following citation to and explanation of cases:
E.g., KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1359-60, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
1835, 1841-42 (Fed.Cir.2000) (concluding that 'KCJ's statements [during
prosecution] reflect a clear and unmistakable surrender' of subject matter that
cannot be reclaimed through the doctrine of equivalents); Bayer AG v. Elan
Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252-53, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711, 1719
(Fed.Cir.2000) (finding that 'through [Bayer's] statements to the PTO and the
declarations it filed, Bayer made statements of clear and unmistakable surrender
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Thus, it is not sufficient to determine whether there is a narrowing of a
limitation to invoke prosecution history estoppel. When an argument to establish
patentability based upon the particular limitation in question and an amendment
that merely clarifies or even broadens a claim limitation are made, then the
applicant is in no better position than if he had made an amendment narrowing a
claim.

IV. FLEXIBLE (VERSUS ABSOLUTE) BAR
Festo's apparent victory is the reversal of the "absolute bar" of the Festo I
opinion and the reinstatement of the previous "flexible bar." However, the Supreme
Court did not reinstate the previous flexible bar as it was known before the Festo I
ruling. Instead, the Supreme Court replaced it with a more draconian presumption
of an absolute bar. 22 As announced by the Supreme Court, this new presumption
makes application of the flexible bar useless for all but a small number of situations.
The Supreme Court decision is a pyrrhic victory for the practitioner toiling in the
vineyards of patent prosecution who is forced to chop down the scope of protection of
a generic claim to exclude known equivalents that were and still could have been
claimed but for an unpatentability ruling by an Examiner.
Reversal of the "absolute bar" with reinstatement of the "flexible bar" is also to
be seen as flowing from the hard-hitting dissent of Judge Michel in the en banc
ruling of the Federal Circuit, which was joined by Judge Rader. 23 Judge Michel
pointedly explained the direct conflict with prior precedent regarding the use of a
flexible bar approach to prosecution history estoppel. 24 Additionally, the dissent of
25
Judge Rader, which was joined by Judges Michel and Linn, was very important.
They emphatically demonstrated the need for equivalents for after-arising
technology. The Supreme Court's result naturally flows from coupling these dissents
with the test for a flexible bar advocated by the Solicitor General.
The Supreme Court accepts the premise that in some cases a flexible bar may
exist. However, the default rule is that any narrowing creates an absolute bar as to
of subject matter' which it could not recapture through the doctrine of
equivalents); Pharmacia & Upjohn, 170 F.3d at 1377, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036 ('A
number of activities during prosecution may give rise to prosecution history
estoppel, ... including arguments made to obtain allowance of the claims at issue.'

(citation omitted)); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1673, 1682 (Fed.Cir.1995) ('Clear assertions made during
prosecution in support of patentability, whether or not actually required to secure
allowance of the claim, may ... create an estoppel.'); Texas Instruments Inc. v.

United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1018, 1025
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that arguments made during prosecution that emphasized
one feature of the invention estopped the patent holder from asserting that a

device lacking
equivalents).
Id.

22 Festo,535
23 Festo,234

21

Id. at 610

25 Id. at

620.

that feature

U.S. at 742.
F.3d at 598.

infringed the

patent under the doctrine

of
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the limitation that has been narrowed. 26 To benefit from a flexible bar, the burden
rests upon the patentee to rebut the presumption of an absolute bar; though, even
this option is only available in limited situations. This holding is set forth at the
27
antepenultimate and penultimate paragraphs of the Festo opinion.
Prosecution history estoppel is keyed to a narrowed element or limitation, and
not to all aspects of the claim. Thus, the Supreme Court "hold[s] here that the
patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not surrender
the particularequivalentin question."28 Furthermore, it is presumed that the bar is
absolute as to all subject matter between the original claim scope and the final
(narrowed) claim scope of the patent. The Supreme Court stated, "[a] patentee's
decision to narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended claim." 29 The
Supreme Court relied upon quotes from Exhibit Supply to support its holding
30
regarding this presumption.
If the presumption cannot be rebutted, then the bar is an absolute bar, i.e., the
exact same result as sought by the appellee and consistent with the result of the
Federal Circuit majority. The Court considers it fair to apply what amounts to an
absolute bar in all but the exceptional cases it has enumerated: "[w]hen the patentee
has chosen to narrow a claim, courts may presume the amended text was composed

26 Fosto,535 U.S. at 742
Festo, 535 U.S. at 740. The Supreme Court explained its view of the "new" flexible bar.
[W]e hold here that the patentee should bear the burden of showing that the
amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question.... The
patentee, as the author of the claim language, may be expected to draft claims
encompassing readily known equivalents. A patentee's decision to narrow his
claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the
territory between the original claim and the amended claim. There are some
cases, however, where the amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as
surrendering a particular equivalent. The equivalent may have been
unforeseeable at the time of the application; the rationale underlying the
amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in
question; or there may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could
not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in
question. In those cases the patentee can overcome the presumption that
prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.
This presumption is not, then, just the complete bar by another name. Rather, it
reflects the fact that the interpretation of the patent must begin with its literal
claims, and the prosecution history is relevant to construing those claims. When
the patentee has chosen to narrow a claim, courts may presume the amended text
was composed with awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is
not an equivalent of the territory claimed. In those instances, however, the
patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of
equivalence. The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one
skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that
would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.
Id. at 740-41 (internal citation omitted).
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 Id.
30 Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136-37 (1942) ("By the amendment
27

[the patentee] recognized and emphasized the difference between the two phrases and proclaimed
his abandonment of all that is embraced in that difference.").
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with awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an equivalent of
the territory claimed."

31

A. Three Situations Where the Bar is Rebuttable
A flexible bar exists "where the amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as
surrendering a particular equivalent."3 2 The Supreme Court gives three situations
where the patentee may rebut the presumption. In any of these three situations "the
patentee can overcome the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a
33
finding of equivalence."

1. The Unforeseen Equivalent
The first situation where there is the possibility of equivalents is the case of the
unforeseen equivalent. 34 The unforeseen equivalent is keyed to the compelling
argument raised in the dissenting opinion of Judge Rader, which argued that
patentees should not be estopped from having their claims cover "after-arising"
35
technology that could not have been anticipated during patent prosecution.
Judge Rader dissented precisely based upon the issue of "after-arising"
technology. Judge Rader stated:
A primary justification for the doctrine of equivalents is to accommodate
after-arising technology. Without a doctrine of equivalents, any claim
drafted in current technological terms could be easily circumvented after
the advent of an advance in technology. A claim using the terms "anode"
and "cathode" from tube technology would lack the "collectors" and
"emitters" of transistor technology that emerged in 1948. Thus, without a
doctrine of equivalents, infringers in 1949 would have unfettered license to
appropriate all patented technology using the out-dated terms "cathode"
and "anode". Fortunately, the doctrine of equivalents accommodates that
unforeseeable dilemma for claim drafters....
By definition, applicants could not have surrendered something that did not
even exist at the time of the claim amendment, namely after-arising
technology.
Because after-arising technology was not in existence during the patent
application process, the applicant could not have known of it, let alone
surrendered it.

36

31

F sto, 122 U.S. at 741.

32

Id. at 740.

Id. at 741
Id.. "The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application...." Id.
'35 Festo, 234 F.3d at 619-21 (Rader, J., dissenting).
'36Jd
'3
'3
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2. "Tangential"Relationsbip
The second situation which may give rise to a finding of equivalents is where
"the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential
relation to the equivalent in question."3 7 The Supreme Court declines to exclude
unforeseeable equivalents. 38 The opinion further states that there is no reason to
exclude equivalents for "aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral relation
39
to the reason the amendment was submitted."

3. Difficulty Claiming the Equivalent
The third circumstance in which equivalents may be allowed is where "there
may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be
40
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question."
One area where a claim cannot be drafted to the full scope of patentability and a
flexible bar is needed is when there is no "written description" to support a
subgeneric range. For example, assume that claim 1 is to "[a] composition ...
including from 10 to 90 mol. % Zarcondium" and claim 2 limits claim 1 to "the
composition of claim 1 wherein the amount of Zarcondium is from 10 to 25 mol 0."
Assume that the patentee can prove that the entire range of 10 to 45 mol. %
Zarcondium is patentable over newly discovered prior art showing Zarcondium at 90
mol. %. Here, claim 1 is clearly unpatentable because it reads directly on the prior
art Zarcondium at 90 mol. %. The applicant would like to claim the range of 10 to
40 mol % Zarcondium, but cannot do so because of a lack of a written description for
this range. So, the patentee resorts to the definition of claim 2 for literal protection
of 10 to 25 mol %.
The first question is then: should a flexible bar give the patentee the right to
equivalents in the range above 25 up to 40 mol. %? The second question is: if so, is it
also necessary that the patentee explain the reason for the amendment not being
coextensive with patentability, at the time of the amendment?

B. Manner of Rebutting the Presumption
To rebut the presumption that an amendment is related to patentability, "[t]he
patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could
not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally
encompassed the alleged equivalent." 41 After-arising technology, situation (1), and
the case of the unsupported range, situation (3), appear to be relatively easy to
understand, but will still require further guidance from the Federal Circuit in the
coming years as it renders opinions that deal with these issues. It is ambiguous how
'37

Festo, 535 U.S. at 740-41

38 d

Id. at 738.
40 Id. at 741
4' Id..
3)
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an amendment made for a tangential reason, situation (2), can be dealt with under
the test that "one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted
42
a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent."

V. WHITHER THE COLORABLE COPYIST
Completely lost in the shuffle and not an issue before the Court in this case was
the question of whether under any circumstance a most trivial difference can avoid
infringement where it does not fall under the objective test of Festo. Throughout the
early years - starting with the trial court opinions of Justice Story - the "colorable"
variation was a target of the judiciary. 43 A colorable taking isone that is strictly
keyed to equity. 44

Clearly, the Federal Circuit majority does not wish to consider the doctrine of
equivalents to be an equitable doctrine that would permit such application of the
"colorable" taking type-remedy. This can be seen from the Festo Icase itself, where
Circuit Judge Plager 45 makes a strong argument for dealing with the doctrine of
equivalents through its limitations as an equitable doctrine. 46 In other words, if a
copyist in the most extreme case made the most trivial variation from the claimed
invention, is there room for the equitable doctrine of equivalents to permit a
resolution in favor of the patentee?
Consider, for example, the routine case where there is the invention of a new
acid, which is fully and properly claimed as such. Back in the deep recesses of the
patent specification there is a single sentence at the end of "Example 493" that states
that the acid of that particular example can be treated with ethanol to create the
ethyl ester. Nothing is more obvious an equivalent than the ethyl ester of an acid.
However, for whatever reason, the claim language does not provide a literal fit to
encompass the ethyl ester. This is simply the routine mistake of even the very good
patent draftsman, even in the highest and most sophisticated pharmaceutical
concerns. Under dietum from Johnson & Johnston, the doctrine of equivalents would
appear to be precluded. 47 This obvious and clearly foreseeable equivalent would also
be outside the test set forth by the Supreme Court's Festo case.
The question thus remains: is there room remaining for the equitable doctrine
of equivalents? In view of prior decisions of the Federal Circuit, this would not
appear possible. To the extent that a regional circuit or the Supreme Court were to
take a fresh look at the clear Supreme Court precedent that makes the doctrine one

42Id.
43Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432)(Story, J).

1 Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine Patent
Infringement in Bioteehnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L. J. 1, 13-14 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
45Judge Plager was considered one of the leading equity scholars for more than a generation
during his academic career on the law faculties of the University of Illinois and Indiana University,
the latter where he served with distinction for many years as the Dean.
16 Festo, 236 F.3d at 593.
47Johnson & Johnston Assoc. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
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of equity, this remains an open question. The opinions of Judges Plager 48 and Linn 49

in Festo I make it clear that there are equitable origins for the doctrine of

18

Festo, 234 F.3d at 593-94 (Plager, J., concurring). Judge Plager explains:
A better solution [than the majority's limitation on equivalents] would be to
declare the doctrine of equivalents -- a judge-made rule in the first place -- to have
its roots firmly in equity, and to acknowledge that when and in what
circumstances it applies is a question of equitable law, a question for which
judges bear responsibility. We have admitted to these roots in a number of cases.
Were this court to openly acknowledge that the doctrine of equivalents
can only be legitimated by its equitable roots and should be treated as an
equitable doctrine, important consequences would flow. Trial courts, sitting as
courts of equity, would be responsible for deciding whether the doctrine of
equivalents should be applied, not unlike the practice regarding the doctrine of
inequitable conduct. On appeal to this court, we would review a trial court's
determination under the deferential standard of abuse of discretion.
By contrast,

the

notion

of "insubstantial differences"

between

a

particular claim and a particular product, viewed as the governing principle, can
never be anything other than an ad hoc judgment, dependent on the eye of the
beholder in the individual case. Though we talk about considering factors such as
the role of copying, interchangeability of elements, and so on, the reality is that,
as our cases since Hilton Davis demonstrate, the decision on equivalents remains
essentially a subjective call, with repetition of verbal formulae but without
transferability from case to case of practical guidance. This to me is the antithesis
of the rule of law.
That infringement under the doctrine is a fact issue is of no moment;
equity courts deal with facts all the time. In addition, a Supreme Court that did
not balk at making the most critical aspect of infringement law--claim
construction--a matter for judges alone, may, when pressed, find it appropriate to
acknowledge the equitable nature of the doctrine of equivalents and the reasons
why judges have a comparative advantage in equitable adjudication.
Id.(internal citations omitted).
49 234 F.3d at 622-24 (Linn, J., dissenting). Judge Linn explains the equitable origins:
In my opinion, the majority's new bright line rule eliminating all flexibility in the
scope of claim limitations amended for a statutory purpose reflects an unjustified
faith in the draftsperson to select language to perfectly describe a new and
unobvious invention at an early stage of the development process. The same
limitations of language noted in selecting words to describe an invention in the
first instance are no less present in selecting words to avoid an examiner's
rejection of that original language for one statutory reason or another.
Furthermore, the majority's new rule will substantially increase the cost
of obtaining patent protection, and may in fact become prohibitively high for
individual inventors and start-up companies. It will require applicants to
undertake exhaustive pre-filing searches, which will not only be costly but also
time consuming. It will also require applicants to file in an original application
numerous "narrow" claims or, if "broad" claims are sought, to be prepared to
argue to the patent examiner, to the board of appeals, and to this court the
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equivalents and there is nothing to preclude the Supreme Court from eventually
following its earlier precedents in this matter.

VI. "FESTO II:

THE SAGA CONTINUES

On February 6, 2003, the Federal Circuit was to have heard oral argument en
banc in Festo once again - based upon its order for post-Supreme Court further
briefing of the case.50 The focus is on a clarification of the flexible bar. The court
quotes from the Supreme Court opinion:
A patentee's decision to narrow his claims through amendment may be
presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory between the original
claim and the amended claim. There are some cases, however, where the
amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular
equivalent. The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more
than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be
some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question. In
those cases the patentee can overcome the presumption that prosecution
history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.... The patentee must show
that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally
encompassed the alleged equivalent. 51
impropriety of all rejections for patentability reasons, rather than to amend those
claims, given the harsh consequences of amendments under the majority's new
bright line rule. It will also deter applicants from attempting to expedite
prosecution and attain early allowance by making minor or clarifying
amendments to the claims, either in anticipation of the initial office action or at
subsequent times during prosecution, for fear of triggering a complete bar to later
reliance on the doctrine of equivalents. This will result in protracted prosecution
and dramatically increased costs for many applications. These increases in costs
and complexity will also come at a time when greater prosecution investments
may be hard for many applicants to justify because the commercial value of the
inventions covered may not then be fully apparent. In my view, this will most
detrimentally impact individual inventors and start-up companies, and may have
the effect of impeding, not advancing, technological progress, contrary to the
purpose of the patent system.

d. (internal citations omited).
50 The order is reported at 304 F.3d 1289, 1290 Fed.Cir. 2002 (en banc). This paper was
prepared before February 6, 2003, and therefore does not consider the proceedings before the court
on that day.
51 Festo 304 F.3d at 1290-91 (quoting Festo,535 U.S. at 740 (citation omitted)). Based upon the
uncertainties seen from the Supreme Court opinion, the Federal Circuit thereupon issued an order
to the parties and an invitation to the bar and the public to consider the following issues:
1.
Whether rebuttal of the presumption of surrender, including issues of
foreseeability, tangentialness, or reasonable expectations of those skilled in the
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Unprecedented numbers of amicus curiae briefs were filed in response to the
invitation to the public. A considerable number of the amici expressed a concern that
there should not be general guidance given in an opinion that is unnecessary to the
factual predicates of the case. It could be said that it was improvident to have
further considered the case en banc - after all, the court could simply have remanded
the case back to the trial court and then permitted the various issues it raised in its
order to percolate upward on a case by case basis back to the Federal Circuit.
There has been no sign that the current majority of the court intends to retreat
from its strict view of claim construction manifested by its opinion Festo I Indeed,
in 2002, shortly before the Supreme Court decision in Festo II the Federal Circuit
upstaged the Supreme Court decision with its en bane pronouncement in Johnson &
52
Johnston where the court further limited the doctrine of equivalents.

VII. AVOIDING DICTA IN OTHER CIRCUITS
It is clear that before the advent of the Federal Circuit, there were regional
circuits that would apply the doctrine of equivalents in equitable situations where
the Federal Circuit - given the exact same scenarios - would not do so. Only some of
these scenarios are precluded from review by the Supreme Court in its Festo II
ruling.
For the remainder of these situations, the Supreme Court has opened the forum
shopping door to regional circuit consideration of patent issues: If a patent
infringement claim is brought through a counterclaim - where the original complaint
lacks a patent claim - then the regional circuit has appellate jurisdiction (as
explained in § A). 5 3 Then, it is a matter of arguing the good law of the regional
circuit - now some twenty or more years old - that is controlling and better than the
rule devised by the Federal Circuit in its Festo opinion.
art, is a question of law or one of fact; and what role a jury should play in
determining whether a patent owner can rebut the presumption.
2.
What factors are encompassed by the criteria set forth by the Supreme
Court.
3.
If a rebuttal determination requires factual findings, then whether, in
this case, remand to the district court is necessary to determine whether Festo
can rebut the presumption that any narrowing amendment surrendered the
equivalent now asserted, or whether the record as it now stands is sufficient to
make those determinations.
4.
If remand to the district court is not necessary, then whether Festo can
rebut the presumption that any narrowing amendment surrendered the
equivalent now asserted.
Id.
52 Johnson & Johnston Assoc. Inc., 285 F.3d 1046. The case involved the deliberate failure to
claim certain embodiments that are disclosed in a patent. Id. The case did not, however, implicate
an estoppel in the sense of a narrowing amendment, but rather an estoppel for failure to claim a
deliberately disclosed but unclaimed embodiment. Id. The Johnson & Johnston case involved the
deliberate failure to claim certain subject matter. Id. The more difficult question arises where there
is an inadvertent disclosure of an equivalent that is somehow not within the literal wording of the
claims - even though it was the obvious intention of the patentee to have done so. Id.
' Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
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A. Vornado: Regional CircuitPatentLaw
The Federal Circuit denial of equity and its strict rules are not binding on other
circuits which - for less than one full month - have renewed patent jurisdiction. The
reopening of the door to regional circuit patent case law is a result of the June 3,
2002, Supreme Court decision in Vornado.54 Vornado overrules the en banc ruling of
the Federal Circuit in Aerojet-Genera 55 granting exclusive jurisdiction over patent
case where the patent cause of action first entered via counterclaim.
In Vornado, the Supreme Court determined that if a well-pleaded complaint
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in a federal court lacks a patent claim, then the
appellate jurisdiction for that case is with the regional circuit. 56 Even if there is a
compulsory patent counterclaim brought into the case, the appeal in the case will go
to the regional circuit. Where the original complaint does not state a patent claim
but then the plaintiffs amended complaint states a patent claim, it is an open
question whether the Federal Circuit law controls. In footnote 1, Justice Scalia says
that the Vornado case "does not call upon [the Court] to decide whether the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction is fixed with reference to the complaint as initially filed or
whether an actual or constructive amendment to the complaint raising a patent-law
57
claim can provide the foundation for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction."
Justice Stevens in his special concurrence in Vornado noted the "countervailing
interest in directing appeals in patent cases to the specialized court that was created,
in part, to promote uniformity in the development of this area of the law."5 8 He
acknowledged, particularly as a result of the decision in Vornado, that "[niecessarily,
therefore, other circuits will have some role to play in the development of [patent]
law." 59 Yet, this was seen as a positive development with the court commenting that
"[a]n occasional conflict in decisions may be useful in identifying questions that merit
60
this Court's attention."

B. REOPENING THE DOOR TO THE WISDOM OF THE EARLIER JURISTS
The Supreme Court in Festo was not called upon to rule on the equity issues
raised in the Plager and Linn opinions. Yet, it is clear that the Federal Circuit will
not accept these views. The question is now whether other circuit courts of appeal

54

Jd

55Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736 (Fed.

Cir. 1990) (en banc).
56 Jd
57 But, the Federal Circuit takes the view that an amended complaint is a part of the original
complaint. Vink v. Schijf, 839 F.2d 676, 678 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
58 Holmes Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 838-39.
F)Id. at 839
60Id. at 839. Soo genorally, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:A Caso Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1, 54 (1989) ("the Federal Circuit demonstrates a greater propatent bias than regional circuits."). Justice Stevens welcomed the chance for inter-circuit conflicts
to flush out areas for Supreme Court review: '[O]ccasional decisions by [the regional circuit] courts
with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop
an institutional bias." Holmes Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 839.
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will do so. What happens where the most trivial change is found such as the case of
the accidentally fully disclosed equivalent?
Consider the case where there is a patent to chemical compounds, per se, that
are in the form of an organic acid. The claim is to a "compound of the formula" with
a particular formula specified. In the patent specification at the last line of the
example showing the manufacture of the compound, there is a one-line statement
explaining that the compound may be converted into its alcohol ester. Assuming
there is no prosecution history estoppel under Festo II, there is the clearest case of
an equivalency imaginable. Under dictum in Johnson & Johnston that deals with a
deliberately disclosed but not claimed equivalent, the Federal Circuit is likely to say
that equivalents should not apply.
However, this is the most equitable situation for the application of the doctrine
of equivalents imaginable. What would happen if a case of this nature were to go
before the Second Circuit, where the law of the late Learned Hand expresses an
equitable philosophy that the doctrine of equivalents should be applicable for every
case?
In Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 61 Judge Hand noted the
limitations of language and the occasional need to find infringement outside the
confines of claim wording:
[A] patent is like any other legal instrument; but it is peculiar in this, that
after all aids to interpretation have been exhausted, and the scope of the
claims has been enlarged as far as the words can be stretched, on proper
occasions courts make them cover more than their meaning will bear. If
they applied the law with inexorable rigidity, they would never do this, but
would remit the patentee to his remedy of re-issue, and that is exactly what
they frequently do. Not always, however, for at times they resort to the
'doctrine of equivalents' to temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer
from stealing the benefit of the invention. No doubt, this is, strictly
speaking, an anomaly; but it is one which courts have frankly faced and
62
accepted almost from the beginning.
Hand noted that for every case, consideration had to be given to whether it was
necessary to stretch the wording of the claim to "reach a just result." 63 A year later,
he explained that "the doctrine of equivalents ...was devised to eke out verbal
insufficiencies of claims ...."64
61 Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.)

(footnote omitted)
62 Id.
63 Id. ("All patents are entitled to its benefit to an extent, measured on the one hand by their
contribution to the art, and on the other by the degree to which it is neeessary to departfrom the
meaning to reach a just result.") (emphasis added).
64 Philip A. Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 177 F.2d 583, 585 (2nd Cir. 1949) (L.
Hand, J.)
If the claims were limited to the 'concise and exact terms' in which the
specification[ ] ordinarily describe[s] a single example of the invention, few, if any,
patents, would have value, for there are generally many variants well-known to
the art, which will at once suggest themselves as practicable substitutes for the
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Five years before the advent of the Federal Circuit, in one of its last cases to
deal with the subject, the Seventh Circuit followed the equitable reasoning of the
Supreme Court: "Of course, the fact that verbally the infringing process is not within
the claim is no objection to the application of the doctrine of equivalents; indeed it
creates the very occasion which should evoke it."65 The equitable nature of the
doctrine jumps from the page.
[Ciourts have ... recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention
which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of
the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would
leave room for indeed encourage the unscrupulous copyist to make
unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent
which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter
outside the claim ....

One who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who

seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play, may be expected to introduce
minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy ...
The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a
patent. Originating almost a century ago in the case of Winans v. Denmead,
it has been consistently applied by this Court and the lower federal courts,
and continues today ready and available for utilization when the proper
circumstances for its application arise. 'To temper unsparing logic and
prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention' a patentee
may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
66
obtain the same result."'

VIII. A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPELS
While the United States has its own unique doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel, this is not a universal practice. Professor Thomas points out that various
other countries do not admit introduction of the prosecution history into evidence in
67
an infringement trial.

specific details of the machine or process so disclosed. It is the office of the claims
to cover these, and it is usually exceedingly difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
do so except in language that is to some degree 'functional'; for obviously it is
impossible to enumerate all possible variants. Indeed, some degree of permissible
latitude would seem to follow from the doctrine of equivalents, which was devised
to eke out verbal insufficiencies of claims...
Id.
65 Panther Pumps & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 18 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Markey, C.J.).
66 Id. (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950))
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
67 John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of
Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 215-16 (1999)
(footnotes omitted) ("Foreign patent regimes have often held that ... prosecution history is
inadmissible as evidence of the meaning of a claim as ultimately agreed. In particular,
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Japan is one country that has a doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, which
was confirmed in the leading case from the Japanese Supreme Court, the
Tsubakimoto case. 68 There, the Japanese Supreme Court fashioned a test for
equivalents which expressly takes into account prosecution history estoppel: "even if
there are elements [of the claimed invention] that differ from the [accused
embodiment], the [accused embodiment] may be equivalent ... if ... (5) there is not
any special circumstances such that the [accused embodiment is] intentionally
excluded from the scope of the claim during patent prosecution."' 69 Later in the same
opinion, the Court states that when a patentee excludes during patent prosecution
an embodiment or equivalent from the technical scope of a patented invention by
intentionally excluding it from the claim language, the patentee cannot substantially
make assertions that would contradict this exclusion since such a contradiction
would not be permitted in view of the law of prosecution estoppel. 70
In terms of prosecution history estoppel the Japanese Supreme Court has yet to
rule on whether a formal amendment should create a bar. However, in the Osaka
High Court - where an equivalents finding was sustained - there had been narrowing
amendments due solely to formal matters.7 1 The case was not, however, appealed to
the Supreme Court. Additionally, the Japanese test for equivalents is also quite
strict but distinctly different from Festo.II Strikingly different from Festo II is the
72
exclusion of equivalents of an element that is "essential" to the patented invention.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether an unforeseen element could be an
73
equivalent.

IX. STATUTORY REFORM TO ELIMINATE PROSECUTION HISTORY
ESTOPPELS
Perhaps there is a better way to deal with limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents than prosecution history estoppel. Two reforms deserve consideration.
Following the lead of Circuit Judges Plager and Linn, reliance on a relatively narrow
doctrine of equivalents determined by a judge - not a jury - makes more sense when
limited to the rare situations where equity demands a finding of equivalence.
Some reliance must be possible based upon the events at the PTO, but is
prosecution history estoppel, with its endless file inspections, really an optimum way
to operate? Perhaps it is time to heed the advice of Professor John R. Thomas:

Commonwealth courts have expressed hostility to the use of the prosecution history to interpret
claims.")
68 Tsubakimoto Seiko Co., Ltd. v. THK K.K., Case No. 1994 (o) 1083, (Japanese Supreme

Court 1998), available at http://www.softic.or.jp/en/cases/Tsubakimoto v THK.html. This case is
sometimes referred to as the "Ball Spline Bearing Case."
(3 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Test

(1) for an equivalent is that "the differing elements are not the essential elements in the

patented invention...." Id.
73 Test (3) is that "a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains ... could
have easily achieved the [accused embodiment]." Id.
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The patent community should take the bold steps necessary to abandon the
use of the prosecution history as a tool of claim interpretation. There is
much to gain by eliminating the tedious inquiry into the chronicle of Patent
Office interchange on the occasion of each claim interpretation. Our
attention is more properly focused upon the text of the patent instrument,
not on preparatory documents of uncertain relation to the proprietary right
74
ultimately granted.
In an era of facile creation of websites, is it not time to abbreviate the patent
instrument and strip out everything other than the claims and corresponding
definitional and enabling disclosure? The rest of what is important can surely be
5
saved in electronic form as part of the electronic prosecution history of the future.'
Clearly, it is an imposition on the public to track down gargantuan prosecution
histories that, for many of the world's readers, are in a foreign language. Must one
hire a someone to copy file wrappers to obtain the raw data to hunt and peck for a
valuable estoppel? 76 While a microscopic snippet of a quotation from the prosecution
history will appear in litigation, it is just that only a minute fraction of the overall
77
picture.

X. CONCLUSION
Reliance upon the doctrine of equivalents is a prospectively dangerous strategy. The
case-by-case determination of an equivalents theory in an ongoing patent litigation
represents a difficult challenge for a patentee. Downstream reform of the patent
74 John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Plaeo of
ProseeutionHistoriesin Patent Claim Interpretation,47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 242 (1999).

75 The entire "Background of the Invention" section has no meaning to inventors seeking to
find new technologies. Cutting out the patent verbiage would only help to focus the reader's
attention on whatever kernels of technological wisdom there may be in the patent disclosure. It also
makes no sense to bury the claims at the end of the patent document - and then to have the twice
redundant generic disclosures that are found at the "Summary of the Invention" and the "Abstract
of the Disclosure." These sections should be eliminated in their entirety, while the claims should be
moved to the first page of the patent where they belong as the most important part of the patent
document.
The Examiner's first action on the merits should be entirely rethought. Instead of a detailed
and often formalistic first action, the initial action should be a form much like that used by the
European Patent Office and the Patent Cooperation Treaty that simply lists the names of the prior
art references, pinpoints the exact page and line numbers considered important. Instead of
characterizing the prior art, the first action should simply use the "X" and "Y" designations of
pertinence that has worked so well in the EPO and PCT examinations.
The prosecution process should be greatly reduced and maintained electronically so as to be
linked to the patent document itself.
76 See Thomas, supra note 74 at 186-87 ("[A]lthough the courts have identified prosecution
histories as a core source of the meaning of patent claims, they remain physically distinct from the
patent instrument and applicable only to the extent litigants wish to place these public records
before a court.").
77 See id.. at 190 (footnote omitted) ("Prosecution histories can be lengthy by any standard, for
often many years pass before the Patent Office allows a patent to issue. Unlike the more tightly
drafted patent instrument, prosecution histories are not designed for ready parsing by a stranger to
the transaction").
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system should include a careful rethinking of the nature, content and purpose of the
prosecution history.

